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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
PHILLIP G. SNYDER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20470 
REPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARIBG 
5TATEMENT_QF_Tffi£_CASE 
Defendant petitioned this Court for rehearing of an 
opinion filed by this Court on July 29, 1987. In the opinion 
authored by Chief Justice Hall, defendant's conviction of theft 
was affirmed. Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable George E. 
Ballif, Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County, 
State of Utah, to one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
Additionally, defendant was fined and ordered to pay restitution. 
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Respondent 
(Respondent's Brief at 1-22). 
This Court in its opinion clearly recognized and 
addressed defendant's argument that the statute of limitations 
bad run on six of the eight theft counts. Finding that the only 
theory of theft presented to the jury was that of embezzlement, 
this Court determined that all criminal actions committed by 
defendant were well within the statute of limitations. 
Defendant has cited no new facts or principle of law 
overlooked by this Court in its opinion, but instead has only 
reiterated the arguments made by the parties in their briefs* 
PQIN3LI 
THIS COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
DEFENDANT EMBEZZLED MONEY ENTRDSTED 
TO HIM BY THE INVESTORS. 
In his petition for rehearing defendant claims that the 
offense of theft occurred, if at all, when he placed the 
investors1 money into his own account instead of a trust account, 
and that under that theory the statute of limitations had run on 
six of the eight counts in the information. Defendant argues 
that the decision by this Court that defendant was guilty of 
embezzlement and therefore, the statute of limitations was not an 
issue, was not supported by the record• * 
In Bl£HD_JU_Ei£JSflJLd r £j£DyiDS_I£illS # 4 Utah 292, 11 P. 
512 (1886), this Court set forth the standard for determining 
whether a petition for rehearing should be granted: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court 
failed to consider some material point in the 
case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or 
that some matter has been discovered which 
was unknown at the time of the hearing. 
* The State acknowledges that in its responsive brief it agreed 
with defendant that theft occurred at the time he placed the 
investors1 money into his own account. Based upon this Court's 
opinion, and the fact that the jury was never instructed on theft 
by deception, but only the crime of embezzlement, the State 
recognizes that its prior concession was erroneous. 
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4 Utah at 294, 11 P. at 512 (citation omitted). In ClllDIDil)SS_JLi. 
^ISlSQUi 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913), this Court stated: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions 
for rehearings in proper cases. When this 
court, however, has considered and decided 
all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, 
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked 
some material fact or facts, or have 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the 
result. . . . If there are some reasons, 
however, such as we have indicated above, or 
other good reasons, a petition for a 
rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it 
is meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
42 Utah at 172-73, 129 P. at 624. 
In the opinion authored by Chief Justice Hall, 5iai£-.Yx 
£jQy&£I# 62 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (July 29, 1987), (Addendum) this 
Court affirmed defendant's conviction after a full and fair 
consideration of defendant's argument on appeal. This Court 
clearly recognized that defendant's contention that the statute 
of limitations had run on the charged offenses was without merit. 
The case was presented, argued, and submitted 
to the jury on the theory of embezzlement, 
and no alternative or conflicting 
instructions were given on the time-barred 
offense of theft by deception. Defendant's 
contention that the jury might have convicted 
on the basis of an offense neither prosecuted 
nor instructed upon is not supported by the 
record and is therefore without merit. 
Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence relating to the specific acts of 
embezzlement is similarly without merit. The 
evidence was not in dispute as to the date 
and the amount invested by each investor 
-3-
named in the information and the date the 
sums were deposited in defendants operating 
account* 
62 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. 
It is clear from a review of defendant's brief, his 
petition for rehearing, and the Court's opinion, that defendant 
does not meet the necessary requirements to grant a petition for 
rehearing. Under CuMDinssr this Court should grant a petition 
for rehearing only if it finds that it overlooked or misconstrued 
any material facts, statute or other principle of law applicable 
in the case. Defendant has done nothing more in his petition 
than repeat the arguments in his brief and the State's brief. 
At trial, the State argued that the present case was a 
classic example of embezzlement. 
And his Honor has instructed you here in 
Instruction No. 11 . . . • "When one 
intentionally and knowingly appropriates 
money of another lawfully in his possession 
to his personal use, without permission for 
such use, the offense of theft is complete. 
The fact that the person intends subsequently 
to return the property or money, or to make 
restitution to the other, does not relieve 
his wrongful act of its criminal nature, 
excuse him or make his offense of theft any 
the less." 
• • • • 
Now, the words unauthorized control are in 
the classic definition of the term 
embezzlement. Now, the word embezzlement is 
not used in this instructions [sic]. But I 
use the word because it's one that you 
understand. The term embezzlement depicts a 
particular type of theft or a particular type 
of unauthorized control. 
And the theory of our case is the classic 
example of embezzlement, is what happened in 
this particular case [sic]. That is, that 
Mr. Snyder came into some money lawfully. He 
4-
didn't, as I said in my opening statement, 
take it at gun point; he didn't sneak into 
the bank at night and take the money. He 
took the money lawfully with some specific 
directions, and then having come into the 
money lawfully, he converted it to his own 
use. 
(R. 1198-99) • 
Theft occurs when one obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof. Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978). Defendant's 
action in failing to put the money into a trust and instead 
placing it into his operating account did not, as defendant 
argues, necessarily constitute theft. There is no evidence that 
at the time that defendant placed the money into his operating 
account that he was exercising unauthorized control with a 
purpose to deprive the investors. In fact, the evidence 
indicated just the opposite. All expenditures by defendant from 
the time he obtained the money until October 16 were for the 
Temple Hills project. 62 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. Thus, although 
defendant failed to put the money into a trust, he was still 
making authorized expenditures for Temple Hills and had taken no 
action to permanently deprive the investors of their money. 
Defendant's act in placing the money into his operating account 
did not complete the crime of theft; theft was not completed 
until October, 1979 when defendant started to make unauthorized 
expenditures. 
In order for defendant to be convicted of theft when he 
failed to put the money into a trust he would have had to have 
been found guilty of theft by deception; i.e. that he did not 
-5-
obtain the money lawfully but instead obtained control by 
misrepresenting that the money would be placed into a trust. Sfifi 
Utah Code Ann. $ 76-6-401(5) , -405 (1978). In this case it would 
have been impossible for the jury to find defendant guilty of 
thett by deception since they were never instructed on this 
theory of theft.2 As Chief Justice Hall stated in his opinion, 
only an instruction on embezzlement was given to the jury. 62 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 16, (R. 153). Thus, assuming as this Court 
must that the jury followed the instructions, it had to have 
found that defendant lawfully obtained the money in order to find 
him guilty of embezzlement. The jury was given the following 
instructions: 
Under the laws of the state of Utah a 
person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises control over the property of 
another with a purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof . . . . 
• . . . 
When one intentionally and knowingly 
appropriates the property of another lawfully 
in his possession, to his personal use 
without permission for such, the offense of 
theft is complete • • • • 
62 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16, (R. 151, 153). While the word 
•embezzlement" was never used in the jury instruction, the 
instruction given and cited by this Court in its opinion clearly 
defined the crime of embezzlement. 
2 The prosecutor presented two theories of theft to the jury in 
closing argument: 1) defendant stole the money when he failed to 
put the money into a trust and instead placed it into his own 
account, and 2) defendant stole the money when he used it for 
purposes unrelated to the Temple Hills project. (R. 1206). 
Although the prosecutor told the jury that theft occurred when 
defendant placed the money'into his own account, the jury was 
never instructed on this theory of theft and thus, the jury could 
not have found that theft occurred at this time. 
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If defendant thought that some of the jurors could have 
found him guilty of theft by deception, therefore placing the 
crime outside of the statute of limitations, then defendant 
should have requested an instruction on that theory. 5iai£_Xx 
UfllfiUr 704 P.2d 568 (Utah 1985). In light of defendants failure 
to request such an instruction a conviction of theft by 
deception was not possible and the only crime defendant could 
have been convicted of was embezzlement, as this Court correctly 
found. 
Finally, defendant argues that even under an 
embezzlement theory, the verdict was still improper. Defendant 
claims that six of the eight counts in the information charged 
defendant with theft within a range of dates commencing in 1979 
when prosecution was barred, and ending in 1980 when it was not 
barred. Defendant argues that because the information lists 
dates outside of the statute of limitations, it is possible the 
jury could have found him guilty of theft on one of those dates. 
The State contends that the dates listed in the 
information prior to October, 1979 merely proscribed the dates 
when defendant obtained lawful possession of the money, an 
element of embezzlement. The crime of theft was not completed 
until October, 1979 when defendant started to make unauthorized 
expenditures. Defendant overlooks the following language by 
Chief Justice Hall: 
The exhibit reflects the deposits of the 
numerous investors, the expenditures, and the 
purpose of each expenditure from August 30, 
1979, through April 29, 1980, when the 
account became overdrawn. None of the early 
expenditures appear to have been made for 
-7-
purposes not related to the Temple Hills 
project. However, beginning in October 1979 
and continuing until the account was 
overdrawn, numerous expenditures were mtade 
for purposes clearly unrelated to the Temple 
Hills project. 
62 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. Because the original information was 
filed on October 6# 1983 (R. 74), and defendant made the first 
unauthorized expenditure on October 16, 1979, (SSLS 62 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 16) the information was filed within the statute of 
limitations.^ 
Because defendant has failed to cite any material fact 
or principle of law overlooked by this Court in its opinion, the 
State urges this Court to deny the petition for rehearing. 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
petition for rehearing should be denied and his conviction 
affirmed. 
DATED this day of December, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK 
Assistant Attorney General 
3
 UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-1-302(1) (1986) provides that a prosecution 
for a felony must be commenced within four years after it is 
committed. 
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Defendant appeals his conviction of theli nl 
funds invested in a condominium project.1 
In July 1979, defendant acquired a tract of 
land in Provo, Utah, for the purpose of dev-
eloping it as a condominium project known as 
Temple Hills. Beginning in August 1979, def-
endant proceeded to presell condominiums to 
be built on the land. The project failed, the 
land was lost, and all of the investors' funds 
were primarily expended on defendant's unr-
elated ventures, which included a gold mine, a 
real estate tfeney, t house, and • ihopping 
mall. 
On October 7, 1981, defendant was charged 
by information with seven counts of theft by 
deception.Apparently to avoid a statute of 
limitations bar to the prosecution, the infor-
mation waj amended to charge nine counts of 
theft.* The information specifically relied upon 
Utah Code Ann. f 76-4-404 (1978), theft 
by unlawful taking or disposition, which 
superseded several of the older definitions of 
theft, including embezzlement.4 
At a pretrial conference, it was resolved that 
the statute of limitations was not an issue. 
And at trial, the State presented its case on the 
theory of embezzlement. 
It was the State's evidence that as an ince-
ntive to investors, defendant offered to disc-
ount the price of each condominium purch-
ased in an amount equal to the sum invested, 
up to $22,200. Alternatively, defendant 
offered to resell a purchased unit and return 
to the Investor double his or her investment, 
which could also be as much as $22,200. The 
investors were told that the purpose of the 
tales was to generate sufficient cash to com-
plete the purchase of the Temple Hills land 
and to begin construction of the condomin-
turns. Defendant also represented that the 
investment opportunity was limited to about 
twelve buyers, that the funds invested would 
be held in trust until enough cash was on hand 
to pay off the sum owing on the land, and 
that the funds would not be expended except 
to purchase the land or as up-front constr-
uction money fnr fhr Temple Hills develop-
ment. 
It was defendant's testimony at trial that he 
did not hold the investors' funds in trust, nor 
did he intend to do so. Defendant testified 
that he believed the money was his to do with 
as he pleased since the earnest money agree* 
ment contained a nonrefundabihty clause. 
It was stipulated for purposes of trial that 
defendant sold a total of twenty-nine cond-
ominiums to some twenty-eight investors, for 
an aggregate sum of $566,600, all of which 
was spent by April 29, 1980, and that none of 
the investors received any of their money 
liar I 
A l j | i e i j ( J S C 0 j j^j 0f l n t evidence, the trial 
court dismissed one of the counts of theft for 
lack of evidence, the alleged victim having 
failed to appear and testify. The jury convi-
cted on the remaining eight counts. 
The trial court sentenced defendant to ti|in 
concurrent terms of one to fifteen years and 
ordered him to pay a fine of $1,000 on each 
count. The trial court also ordered defendant 
to make restitution to the persons who inve-
sted in the project, not to exceed $500,000. 
The restitution amount was to be determined 
(a) by agreement between defendant and the 
Department of Corrections, (b) through civil 
litigation, or (c) by further order of the court. 
Defendant's motion for a new trial was 
denied, and this appeal followed. 
Defendant's first point on appeal is that the 
evidence was insufficient to support his con-
victions under the theft by unlawful taking or 
disposition statute, and therefore the jury 
must have convicted him of theft by decep-
tion, an offense time-barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
Section 76-6-404 provides, "A f>r i« I in 
commits theft if he obtains or exeitiscs una-
uthorized control over the property of another 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof.* Sub-
section 76-6-401(4) defines 'obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control" as including 
conduct "heretofore defined or known as ... 
embezzlement." Prior to the enactment of the 
present criminal code, we held that the offense 
of embezzlement was committed when one 
entrusted with the property of another conv-
erted it to his or her own use.1 However, the 
taking of property into possession by unlawful 
means, such is by trick or deception, did not 
constitute embezzlement.* 
In the instant case, the Stite hiving elected 
to prosecute on a theory of embezzlement, it 
was not in dispute that defendant lawfully 
obtained possession of the funds of the tnve-
NCE REPORTS 
Far eeapku I'tai C o4t ft • Mint lout mmrnh C o * • CVi AoooiatkNi StrvSc* 
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ttort. What was in dispute was the authority 
defendant hid to expend the funds entrusted 
to him. Defendant denied wrongdoing of any 
kind. He testified that the funds were lawfully 
his to do with as he saw fit. On the other 
band, it was the State's evidence that the 
funds entrusted to defendant were only trt hr 
expended on the Temple Hills project. 
The jury was duly instructed on the elem-
ents of the offense of theft by unlawful takinf 
or disposition in the following manner: 
Under the laws of the state of 
Utah a person commits theft if be 
obtains or exercises control over the 
property of another with a purpose 
to deprive the owner thereof.... 
•••• 
When one In tent ion i l ly and 
knowingly appropriates the propcrt) 
of another lawfully in his potto 
sion, to his persona) use without 
permission for such, the offense of 
theft is complete.. 
The case was presented, argued, and sub-
mined to the jury on the theory of embezzle* 
Bitot, and no alternative or conflicting Instr-
uctions were given on the time-barred 
offense of theft by deception. Defendant's 
contention that the jury might have convicted 
on the basis of an offense neither prosecuted 
nor instructed upon is not supported by the 
record and is therefore without merit. 
Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence relating to the specific acts of 
embezzlement is similarly without merit. The 
evidence was not in dispute as to the date and 
the amount invested by each investor named in 
the information and the date the sums were 
deposited in defendant's operating account. 
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Brent C. Morris testified oi. u..*.. „i ttt 
State. He had conducted an investigation and 
had analyzed defendant's operating account. 
Morri$ prepared a summary of the account 
which was received in evidence as Exhibit 47. 
The exhibit reflects the deposits of the nume-
- us investors, the expenditurea, and the 
~- vc of ta;h expenditure from August 30, 
through April 29, 1980, when the 
account became overdrawn. None of the early 
expenditures appear to have been made for 
purposes not related to the Temple Hills 
orojed. However, beginning in October 1979 
;d continuing until the account was overd-
rawn, numerous expenditures were made for 
purposes clearly unrelated to the Temple Hills 
project. Expenditures which the jury could 
have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
were made in breach of the investors* trust are 
as follows: 
• '"
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... - intends that the trial court 
ai| defendant's motion for a new 
trial before new counsel could obtain a tran-
script of the triaJ proceedings. The trial court 
dmicd the motion for a new trial, stating that 
there was sufficient evidence to submit the 
Issue of guilt to the jury and that it was limply 
trial strategy for former defense counsel not to 
have offered evidence of which be had kr 
wledge. Defendant does not now dispute it t 
grounds for the ruling of the trial court. 
Moreover, defendant fails to suppoi t 
contention of error with any reference to the 
record, and this Court's perusal of the record 
fails to disdose any request for or denial of a 
continuance or that defense counsel objected 
to proceeding with the motion without more 
time to prepare. For these reasons, we do not 
consider the matter further and find no error 
on the pan of the trial court, 
Fa* coais4rtt Utaa Co6* AsmoUtk>a«, C M M I I CWcaO's Aatoubo* Sttvict 
I i 111 i KSCE REPORTS I I 
(c) If the defendant object! to the 
imposition, amount or distribution 
of the restitution, the court shall at 
the time of sentencing allow him a 
full hearing on such issue. 
(4) At tiled in subsect ion (J) 
above: 
(a) 'Criminal activities* meanJ 
any offense with respect to which 
the defendant is convicted or any 
other criminal conduct for which 
the defendant admits responsibility 
to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing 
the criminal conduct; 
(b) 'Pecuniary damages01 memos 
•I! special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could 
recover against the defendant to a 
civil action arising out of the facts 
or events constituting the defen-
dant's criminal activities and shall 
include, but not be limited to, the 
money equivalent of property 
taken, destroyed, broken or other-
w ise harmed,, and losses such as 
earnings and medical expenses; 
(c) "Restitution* means full, 
partial or nominal payment for 
pecuniary damages to a victim, 
including insured damages; 
(d) "Victim" means any person 
whom the court determines has 
suffcrcd pecuniary damages as a 
result of the defendant's criminal 
activities; "victim" shall not include 
any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
rw- - .. , nnal point ol ti.v , « »h.i. the 
! in ordering the payment of 
fines & "*n his contentions being: (1) 
ihat th r no inquiry of his 
ability to pay; <2) that the trial court stated no 
reasons for ordering restitution; (3) that the 
trial court ordered restitution to alleged 
victims not named in the information; and (4) 
that the manner of enforcing the payment of 
Iinn and forfeiture was unclear in its scope. 
It firs within the discretion of the trial court 
to impose sentence or a combination of sent-
ences which may include the payment of a 
fine, restitution, probation, or imprisonment.7 
However, upon conviction of a crime which 
has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition 
to any other sentence imposed, the trial court 
is statutorily mandated to order the payment 
of restitution unless the court finds that rest-
itution is inappropriate. In this regard, Utah 
Code Ann. { 76 3-201 (Supp. 1981) 
(amended 1983, 1986 A 1987) provided, in 
pertinent part: 
(3Xa) When a person is adjudged 
guilty of criminal activity which has 
resulted in pecuniary damages, in 
addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, the court shall order 
that the defendant make restitution 
to the victim or victims of the 
offense of which the defendant has 
pleaded guilty, is convicted, or to 
the victim of any other criminal 
conduct admitted by the defendant 
to the sentencing court unless the 
court in applying the criteria in 
section 3(b) of this chapter, findi 
that restitution is inappropriate If 
the court determines that restitution 
is appropriate or inappropriate, the 
court shall make the reasons for the 
decision a pa ;rt: of the court record, 
(b) In determining whether or not 
. to order restitution, or restitution 
which is complete, partial or 
nominal, the court shall take into 
account: (i) The financial rcsou 
rces of the defendant and the 
burden that payment of restitution 
will impose, with due regard to the 
other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) The ability of the defe ndi.nl 
to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be 
fixed by the court; 
(iii) The rehabilitative effect on 
the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and flic method of 
payment; and 
(iv) Other circumstances which }n 
the opinion of the court shall make 
rest it ution inappropriate. 
Subsection 76~3-201(3K*) was amended in 
1983 to require that trial courts make the 
reasons for restitution orders part of their 
written orders.* Thus, in this case, it was error 
for the trial court not to set forth in writing its 
reasons for ordering restitution. However, the 
record reflects that the error was not prejudi-
cial.* 
Defendant lodged no objection to the imp-
osition, amount, or distribution of the restit-
ution ordered. Nor did he request a hearing on 
the issue. Instead, he focused only upon the 
merits of his candidacy for probation, conte-
nding that freedom would enhance his ability 
to make restitution. He thus waived the right 
he had to challenge the order of restitution. 
This is clearly a case where it was appropr-
; to ordet restitution. Defendant stipulated 
i he had luipated $566,600 of the Tcmpk 
.. JJ inv« ?* funds, and the evidence was 
that he had acquired substantial assets consi-
sting of a house purchased from Dr. Jeffrey 
interests in a shopping mall, Western Amer-
ican Mining, and mining equipment; and 
deposits totalling $334,000 not related to the 
Temple Hills project. Defendant also claimed 
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to have had a personal net worth of $200,000 
in 1979, and at the time of trial, he was 
employed as a consultant for Tel-America. 
Defendant*! contention that the trial court 
erred in ordering restitution to victims not 
named in the information is similarly without 
merit. Subsection 76-3-201(4)(d) defi 
•victim' as any person who the court deter-
mines has suffered pecuniary damages as a 
result of the defendant's criminal conduct. 
Also, 'pecuniary damages" is defined as all 
special damages which a person could recover 
against a defendant in a civil action arising out 
of the same facts supporting his criminal 
prosecution. The fact that defendant stipulated 
to having caused pecuniary damage in the 
amount of $566,600 to twenty-eight Temple 
Hills investors is dispositive of thii issue. 
Defendant's remaining contention, that the 
scope of the restitution order is unclear, is 
obviated by the clarity of the language cev 
ained in the order itself: 
3. The Defendant is ordered 
make restitution to the individuals 
who invested money in the Temple 
Hills condominium project. The 
amount of restitution shall be det 
ermined by: a) agreement between 
the Defendant and the Division of 
Corrections, b) as determined 
through civil litigation, or c) b> 
further order of the Court. P 
amount of restitution shall i 
exceed $500,000.00. 
It is thus definite and certain that defendant is 
to pay the pecuniary damages suffered by his 
victims, not to exceed $500,000. The flexibility 
in the order which permits the individual 
amounts of restitution to be determined either 
by agreement, by litigation, or by order of the 
court comports with good sentencing practice 
and protects the interests of all concerned. The 
order does not exceed the authority prescribed 
by law, nor does it constitute an abuse of the 
trial court's discretion.1* Consequently,, we do 
not disturb it. 
The conviction and judgment ar affirm* d 
WE CONCUR: 
I. Daniel Stewart, Associate Chief Ju*..~. 
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HALL, Chief Jastkt: 
Plaintiff appeals the summary judgment of 
dismissal of his claim for medical malpractice. 
The only viable issue on appeal is whether the 
trial court correctly concluded that plaintiffs 
claim was barred by the four-year statute of 
repose contained to I J tab Code Ann. f 78-
li-4(1987).t 
In May 1973, defendant performed correc-
tive surgery on plaintiffs ankle necessitated 
by an injury sustained in an automobile acci-
dent. On February 19, 1982, plaintiff allegedly 
discovered that the surgery had been neglige-
ntly performed and commenced this lawsuit 
with the filing of a complaint on December 
28, 1982. 
On appeal, plaintiff advance* the mune 
arguments presented to the trial court. He 
contends that his complaint was timely fikd 
within two years of the date his injury was 
discovered, and in reliance upon our decision 
in Foil r. BtUingtr,* be contends that his 
claim should not have bees extinguished 
before it was discovered. 
Utah Code Ann. f 71-14-4 (1987) 
(effective April 1, 1976) provides, in pertinent 
^
 N o m A jp f m c t | c e ftCtjon against 
health care provider may be 
ught unless It it commenced 
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